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1 Introduction
Contemporary technology creates a proliferation of non-
human artificial entities such as robots and intelligent
information systems. Sometimes they are called ‘artificial
agents’. But are they agents at all? And if so, should they
be considered as moral agents and be held morally
responsible? They do things to us in various ways, and
what happens can be and has to be discussed in terms of
right and wrong, good or bad. But does that make them
agents or moral agents? And who is responsible for the
consequences of their actions? The designer? The user?
The robot? Standard moral theory has difficulties in coping
with these questions for several reasons. First, it generally
understands agency and responsibility as individual and
undistributed. I will not further discuss this issue here.
Second, it is tailored to human agency and human
responsibility, excluding non-humans. It makes a strong
distinction between (humans as) subjects and objects,
between humans and animals, between ends (aim, goal)
and means (instrument), and sometimes between the moral
and the empirical sphere. Moral agency is seen as an
exclusive feature of (some) humans. But if non-humans
(natural and artificial) have such an influence on the way
we lead our lives, it is undesirable and unhelpful to exclude
them from moral discourse. In this paper, I explore how we
can include artificial agents in our moral discourse, without
giving up the ‘folk’ intuition that humans are somehow
special with regard to morality, that there is a special
relation between humanity and morality—whatever that
means. Giving up this view happens if we lower the
threshold for moral agency (which I take Foridi and
Sanders to do), or if we call artefacts ‘moral’ in virtue of
what they do (which I take Verbeek to do in his inter-
pretation of Latour and others) or in virtue of the value we
ascribe to them (which I take Magnani to do). I propose an
alternative route, which replaces the question about how
‘moral’ non-human agents really are by the question about
the moral significance of appearance. Instead of asking
about what kind of ‘mind’ or brain states non-humans
really have to count as moral agents (approach 1), about
what they really do to us (approach 2), or about what value
they really have (approach 3), I propose to redirect our
attention to the various ways in which non-humans, and in
particular robots, appear to us as agents, and how they
influence us in virtue of this appearance. Thus, I leave the
question regarding the moral status of non-humans open
and make room for a study of the moral significance of how
humans perceive artificial non-humans such as robots and
are influenced by that perception in their interaction with
these entities and in their beliefs about these entities. In
particular, I argue that humans are justified in ascribing
virtual moral agency and moral responsibility to those non-
humans that appear similar to themselves—and to the
extent that they appear so—and in acting according to this
belief.
Thinking about non-humans implies that we reconsider
our views about humans. My project in that domain is to
shift at least some of our philosophical attention in moral
anthropology from what we really are (as opposed to non-
humans) to anthropomorphology: the human form, what
we appear to be, and how other beings appear to us given
(our projections and recreations of) the human form. I want
to make plausible that it is not their intentional state, but
their performance that counts morally, and that we can gain
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by moving from a discussion about artificial intelligence to
a discussion about artificial performance.
2 The trouble with the standard account of moral
agency and responsibility
Let me start from what I call the standard account of moral
agency and moral responsibility, which is ascribed on the
basis of moral agency.
Agency refers to the ability to act. Usually action is
understood as more than ‘doing’; it depends on, and is the
result of, a mental state such as ‘desire’, ‘intention’,
‘decision’, etc. Agency need not involve freedom or
rationality. The mental state and the action can be ‘not free’
but caused by an external entity; the decision need not be
rational, etc. On this account, a cat can be an agent, but a
plant cannot. Following Himma (2007), on whose useful
summary of the discussion on agency I draw in this section,
we can make a further distinction between natural and
artificial agents. If it has intentional states that lead to
(some would say: cause) ‘performances’, a ‘highly
sophisticated computer could be considered an agent’
(Himma 2007, p. 5), and some advanced robots could also
be considered an agent if they meet the same condition.
Thus, on this account of action and agency there has to be
(1) an intentional mental state and (2) this state has to
‘cause’ a performance.
A further step, then, is moral agency. Ideas about
moral agency depend on the view taken on what counts as
‘moral’ or ‘morality’. Some say that the action has to be
governed by moral standards, that we have moral rights
and duties. Most of us agree that moral agency entails
that the agent can be held accountable for its action, that
is, it can be held responsible. Let me summarize what I
take to be the standard account of moral agency and
moral responsibility.
Moral agency depends on at least two conditions and
one common precondition (Himma 2007, pp. 14–18). First,
one has to have the capacity to freely choose one’s acts; the
agent’s behaviour is not compelled by something external
to. Furthermore, this requires that the person deliberate, or
has at least the capacity to do so. Free choice also pre-
supposes that the agent be rational. A second condition is
that one has to know the difference between right and
wrong. This requirement is often understood as knowing
how to apply moral concepts and principles. A common
necessary (but not sufficient) precondition for these two
conditions is that the agent has the capacity for con-
sciousness and self-consciousness. Punishment requires
that it is possible ‘to produce an unpleasant mental state’
(Himma 2007, p. 17), and free choice supposes the capa-
bility of conscious deliberation.
There are various theories of moral responsibility, which
rely on similar conditions: a moral-libertarian condition
and a moral-epistemological condition. Most refer back
to the two Aristotelian conditions as put forward in the
Nicomachean Ethics: (1) the agent has to act freely and (2)
needs to know what (s)he is doing. Sometimes the first
condition is called autonomy or self-control: I can change
and control my internal states; they are not put into me by
an evil demon or a mad scientist (to use examples from
the literature). Animals are supposed not to meet these
conditions, and therefore they are not to be blamed or
punished. They do not ‘deserve’ it (of course, in concrete
life they often are blamed and punished—especially if
they appear to meet the two conditions. I will return to
this observation). But what about artificial agents? Could
highly ‘developed’ or ‘evolved’ artificial agents be said to
act freely, understand the requirements of morality, and
know what they are doing? Are (very) young children
moral and responsible agents in this sense? Are criminals
who are diagnosed ‘psychopathic’ moral agents? It is not
difficult to see that this account of moral agency and moral
responsibility meets many challenges in the face of prac-
tical problems. Not only is it hard to attribute freedom and
consciousness to natural or artificial agents in principle, the
particularly hard question is the practical one of deter-
mining whether or not any particular natural or artificial
agent is free and conscious. As Himma notes, ‘philosophers
have yet to solve even the problem of justifying the belief
that other human beings than ourselves are conscious (‘the
problem of other minds’)’ (Himma 2007, p. 23), so how
can we tackle the problem of other artificial ‘minds’? More
generally, my question is: how can we talk about the
morality of non-humans within this framework, given
that the attribution of a moral status depends on condi-
tions which are difficult to prove and (in many instances)
unlikely to be met?
Note that the standard account is, within its own bound-
aries, highly incomplete in its description of what morality
consists in: morality does not only require the application of
principles, but also the use of moral imagination, which
allows us to explore the potential consequences of our
actions, create novel action options, improvise, and put
ourselves in the place of the other (Johnson 1993; Fesmire
2003; Coeckelbergh 2007). But this addition to the theory
does not solve the problem with regard to the moral status of
non-human agents, since imagination is a mental operation.
The problem of (other) minds persists.
The problem even gets worse when we consider the
crucial role of technology and artefacts in shaping our
contemporary society and existence. For instance, Bruno
Latour’s actor-network theory and his thinking on moder-
nity (Latour 1993) are reflections of the importance of
materiality in our lives. Technology and artefacts ‘do’
182 AI & Soc (2009) 24:181–189
123
things to us—sometimes good things, sometimes bad
things—and co-shape how we live our lives (Verbeek
2005). But does that render them moral? According to the
standard theory, they are not even agents, let alone moral
agents. There is no evidence that computers have mental
states (some philosophers even continue to doubt that
humans have such states—this is the so called problem of
‘other minds’). Some predict that computers could get
mental states in the future, or that the internet will become
conscious. But so far, these technologies are ‘mindless’;
yet, they exert much influence over our lives. A speed
bump is not an agent, since it does not have mental states.
Yet it directs our behaviour. With some imagination, one
could say that someone else had the intention to slow the
traffic down, and delegated this intention to the artefact, the
speed bump.1 But this does not imply that the speed bump
itself has an intention—or any mental state for that matter.
And it does not help to apply the term ‘delegated’
responsibility, since there are always unexpected outcomes
possible, so in our practice of responsibility ascription
we cannot refer to the designer alone. The problem
of responsibility ascription remains: who or what is
responsible?
Even if artefacts could in principle have mental states,
consciousness etcetera and therefore would be considered
as (moral) agents, then we still have no way to find out
whether or not a particular artefact has these properties,
and this gets the standard theory in trouble since it requires
such proof. On the standard account, without such proof we
cannot ascribe responsibility to, say, an artificially intelli-
gent ‘mass murder’ robot; the robot and other entities of its
kind remain outside the moral sphere altogether.
But why holding on to the standard theory? Some try to
pull artefacts into the moral domain by giving them the
label ‘moral’ in virtue of their ability to cause good or bad
things or in virtue of their being the object of moral attri-
bution. Let me explain these two options. The first is to
recognise that artefacts, things have moral consequences,
some of which are ‘delegated’ to them by the designer,
some of which are unintended. In What Things Do Verbeek
calls this ‘the morality of artefacts’ (Verbeek 2005).2 At
first sight, there seems no good objection to applying the
label ‘moral’ to artefacts in this specific sense. However, as
I argued, the fact that things do something to us, does not
itself warrant calling them moral agents, or holding them
responsible. We do not want to say that a speed bump is
‘responsible’ for slowing us down. If one chooses to talk
about the ‘morality’ of things, as Verbeek (2005) does,
then this ‘solution’ is at the cost of running against the
intuition that humans and morality have a special, exclu-
sive relation. Moreover, Verbeek’s approach applies to all
artefacts, but does not account for the difference we
experience between what a speed bump does to us and
what a humanoid robot with (some) artificial intelligence
does to us. The first is about the consequences artefacts
have for our behaviour and our lives. But we do not
experience these artefacts themselves as being ‘moral’. The
second—so we experience or imagine—is about what
something that is ‘more than a thing’ does to us. It appears
to us as an agent. How can we better conceptually grasp
this intuition?
A different way of applying the label ‘moral’ to things is
not to focus on the transfer of intention and responsibility
from subjects (humans) to objects (artefacts), but on the
transfer of value. We humans not only design artefacts, but
also give value to objects, artefacts, and other non-humans.
In this sense we also make them ‘moral’. I take Magnani
(2007) to follow this route in his recent book. However,
this is not the sense of ‘moral’ we imply when we talk
about ‘moral agents’: we want to say something about its
(apparent) agency, not about what is being done to it.
Moreover, I cannot see how the mere observation that an
object is valued—is given value—could be a reason at all
to ascribe responsibility to it.
In sum, with regard to the problem of responsibility,
these two alternative approaches do not really solve the
problem. And apart from the already mentioned difficul-
ties, an underlying major problem persists: we need to
know ‘what really is the case’ in order to ascribe respon-
sibility. While we no longer have to discuss about the real
mental states of animals, robots, and objects, we still have
to find out that is the case about the real intentions of the
designer or the real value people assign to things. This
renders the ascription of responsibility difficult, since we
need access to the ‘mental states’ of people. And this was
exactly the main problem I detected in the standard
approach.
The solution I propose is to shift our attention from the
real to appearance. As long as we define the problem of
moral agency and responsibility of non-human, artificial
agents as a problem of mind (‘other minds’), then it
remains a mystery how even humans are able to act
morally and responsible, and we will never be able to
conceptually grasp what already goes on between humans
and non-humans with regard to morality. Verbeek’s turn to
what things do remedies this problem, but his conclusion
that we therefore should talk about ‘moral’ artefacts or the
‘morality of things’ goes at the cost of diluting the
anthropocentric meaning we like to give to the terms
‘moral’ and ‘morality’. And Magnani rightly turns to the
1 For a discussion of Latour’s concept of delegation see also Verbeek
(2005).
2 The term was first introduced by Hans Achterhuis, who thought we
should ‘moralise’ things, that is, delegate our moral intentions to
them.
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subject—we give value to things—but this does not take
seriously the fact that things do morally relevant things in
the sense that they have morally relevant consequences.
Moreover, we not only attribute value to things; in practice,
but also attribute agency and responsibility to non-human
entities. This is the relevant problem I started from. Finally,
part of the difficulty emerges from an approach to (moral)
philosophy that first aims to ‘get the concepts right’ and
then wants to apply it to (moral) practice. I propose to start
from experience and practice. In particular, I wish to take
seriously the anthropocentric practice of agency-attribution
and responsibility-attribution to non-humans. We already
experience and treat some animals and perhaps some
advanced robots as moral agents. How can we justify and
make sense of this experience and practice without taking
recourse to the standard approach? What kind of practices
and experiences do I have in mind, and what concepts do
we need to understand and evaluate them?
3 Appearance, experience, and practice: towards
a conception of virtual agency and responsibility
Let us pause for a moment and consider how we experience
and treat other humans. The standard account of moral
agency and moral responsibility starts from a kind of
Cartesian ‘mind’ problem: we might doubt that our own
thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc., are really ours. Is there a
demon which deceives me, and pulls the strings? I might
falsely believe that I act freely. This doubt is then projected
onto ‘other minds’: do they also act ‘freely’? Do they have
minds? Are they conscious at all? Can we, therefore, be
sure that they are moral agents, or agents at all? Perhaps
your wife is a robot, your colleague a zombie, and your
neighbour a projection in your mind? Perhaps we must
doubt all external reality, as Descartes did? Perhaps we live
in ‘The Matrix’? In real life, however, people seldom
contemplate such an issue, and if they did so frequently,
they would rightly run the risk of being considered mad by
their fellows. Instead, people go on to interact with each
other, presuming that the other is a free, moral agent who
can and should take moral responsibility. Of course,
sometimes we distrust others with regard to their moral
status and virtue. For example, the jurisdiction in some
murder cases hinges on the question whether or not the
person can be considered responsible for his (most of the
time it is a man) deeds. But if we ask the question and try to
find out, we—professionals and others—do this, not on the
basis of an investigation of their mind (‘where can we find
free will?’), but rather on the basis of how they appear to
us and what we experience when we interact with them.
Furthermore, if we wonder what other people think, we use
our capacity for empathy: we put ourselves in their place,
we imagine how it would be to stand in their shoes. We do
not really penetrate into the ‘depth’ of their minds, and
there is no need to do so in moral practice. We interact with
others, treat them, ascribe responsibility to them, and
blame them on the basis of how they appear to us, not on
the basis of what kind of mental states that person really
has—if we could every know that at all.
In our relation with non-humans, then, we use a similar
as if approach, which turns out to be sufficient to support
the (quasi)moral and social dimension of our dealings with
them. We treat pets such as dogs and cats as if they have
their own ‘will’ and ‘thoughts’. We (will) interact with
humanoid robots as if they are human. We need not know
their ‘mental states’ for blaming them, for treating them as
companions, or even for loving them. Both the ascription
of agency and of responsibility are, in practice, indepen-
dent of the real. I coin the terms virtual agency and virtual
responsibility to refer to the responsibility humans ascribe
to each other and to (some) non-humans on the basis of
how the other is experienced and appears to them. This
concept accounts of our present and future talking about
some non-humans (including artificial agents) in moral
terms, and sustains our moral practices.
Consider again how standard moral theory tries to tackle
the problem of responsibility of artificial agents. Himma
writes: ‘Free will poses tremendous philosophical diffi-
culties that would have to be worked out before the tech-
nology can be worked out; if we do not know what free will
is, we are not going to be able to model it technologically’
(Himma 2007, p. 22). I believe it is exactly the other way
around. Free will has to be ‘technologically modelled’ first,
in robot/AI design or in imagination, before we can fully
work out the philosophical difficulties. First we have to
design or create in fiction artificial agents. We can then
observe or imagine that some of them will appear to have a
free will and other mental features and mental states, that
they have virtual moral agency. We notice how humans
interact with them on this basis, and acknowledge this in
our moral theory. For instance, if some people would really
start to love robots, then this will force us to discuss about
the concept of love. Similarly, if some people started to
treat some humanoid robots as if they are moral agents,
then we would need to think about our concept of moral
agency.
But does this mean that virtual agency and responsibility
are descriptive concepts only? I do not think so. Real
responsibility, as I shall call the concept of responsibility
put forward by the standard account, allowed us to dis-
criminate between good and bad ways to ascribe moral
responsibility, or rather, it was meant to do so, but it did not
very well succeed given its dependence on insight in
mental states. Virtual responsibility can also discriminate
between good and bad ways to ascribe moral responsibility,
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but instead of making that evaluation dependent on
(searching for) the existence of ‘real’ mental states, it relies
on the appearance and experience of mental states, and on
(observing or imagining) the practices based on that
appearance and experience. Thus, instead of asking whe-
ther or not a criminal really had the capacity of free will at
the moment of his deed, we must acknowledge that we
cannot know the answer to that question. Rather, we can
only go by appearance: we can try to imaginatively con-
struct the crime scene and the history of interaction
between criminal and victim, put ourselves in the mind of
criminal and victim, etcetera. And there are good and bad
ways of doing that. Some perceptions and imaginative
(re)constructions are more adequate than others. This is
what happens in practice, of course. Legal epistemology
pretends to go for reality, but it can only reach appearance.
Nevertheless, it manages to reach conclusions on respon-
sibility and blame that are more or less accepted by society.
Legal and non-legal responsibility ascription in society
relies on ‘outer’ performance, not on ‘inner’ reality. As for
our interaction with non-humans, we observe that in
interaction with pets, for example, humans project them-
selves into their animals, anthropomorphise them. But this
need not be a moral problem. It is perfectly acceptable—
morally and socially—to proceed in this way, if and when
there is indeed a similarity in form, in appearance between
the two. We evaluate the animal in terms of its perfor-
mance: it may or may not appear to have free will. The
aesthetic-phenomenological dimension of agency and
responsibility ascription already has considerable and suf-
ficient normative power to sustain the moral life—what-
ever the ‘reality inside’ may be.
Of course, virtual responsibility, based on virtual
agency, should be followed (if at all) by virtual blame and
punishment, not real blame and punishment. That is, if we
ascribe virtual responsibility to a human, a dog or a robot,
then we should not attempt to really blame or punish them.
Instead, it suffices that there is the appearance of what
Himma calls an ‘unpleasant mental state’. Thus, we could
create humanoid robots that appear to be unhappy when we
blame them or ‘punish’ them. And if people wish to
‘blame’ their dog and act in such a way that the dog
appears to be unhappy, why not? To the extent that they
appear as (quasi-)social beings, a speech act may suffice for
that purpose, and, more important, such punishment must
meet the condition that they appear as responsible, moral
agents. To me and most people both pets and current robots
appear differently: they do not appear to us as virtual moral
agents, which means that the condition for virtual respon-
sibility (and therefore blame and punishment) is not met. In
the future this might change. But note that for designers the
requirement is considerably lower than that of the standard
account: the appearance of moral agency suffices, the robot
need not have real mental states, a real ‘mind’—if that
were possible at all. Humans, by contrast, can meet the
condition in many instances and cases, though not always.
And the appearance of punishment, which knows many
varieties, should suffice. Punishment should not be ‘sym-
bolical’, since this would mean we suppose a link with the
real, of which we cannot be sure, but rather performant,
i.e., able to create the appearance of suffering. This, at
least, is in tune with our moral practices (and sometimes
the appearance of regret is held more important than the
appearance of suffering). But in any case, in court and
elsewhere we have to go by appearance, we can never
know for sure what the person really thinks or feels at the
time of the deed and at the time of punishment.
One may object: why should we punish at all, if
responsibility is virtual? And does the above justification
for the ‘theatre of punishment’ not amount to giving in to
lust for blood? Several justifications have been given for
punishment of humans, and many of them are at least
morally dubious (Honderich 1969). But what about
virtual moral agents and virtual punishment? Consider the
two main theories: retributivism and consequentialism
(including utilitarianism). Retributivism says that we
should punish someone because (s)he deserves it and in
proportion to the severity of the crime. With regard to
humans, it is hard to find a good justification for this view,
but it can be explained as a satisfaction of revenge, or, as
Honderich (1969) has argued, a satisfaction of grievance.
Now in case of virtual desert and virtual punishment, the
‘advantage’ is that such feelings of revenge or grievance on
the part of humans—and ‘the lust for blood’—can be sat-
isfied without necessarily doing harm to anyone. However,
this argument assumes that satisfaction of such feelings is
acceptable as a moral good and a social aim. This brings us
to the question what kind of society we want. This is the
focus of consequentialist arguments: punishment is justi-
fied if it contributes to a better, more humane society, e.g.,
by preventing crime or by providing other gains for society.
Again, as an argument for punishment this is weak with
regard to humans (for lack of empirical evidence), and that
does not change if we consider virtual punishment of vir-
tual moral agents. Our main task seems to make sure that
such entities do not harm humans and society but rather
benefit them. Unless the satisfaction of feelings of revenge
and grief counts as a benefit, virtual punishment does not
seem to contribute to that aim. Instead, it appears to con-
tribute to the de-humanisation of society.
Apart from the problem of justification, there is the
further question if robots or other intelligent entities can be
punished at all. The notion of virtual punishment solves the
problem that artefacts cannot feel pain or suffer, since this
is not required for virtual punishment. Since I shifted the
focus from the capacities of the virtual agent to perception
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by humans, the requirement is different: I expect that if
there is the appearance of moral agency, there is also a
capacity to be virtually punished. But again, I think this is
unlikely, and certainly at the moment.
But if there are little or no artificial agents and robots
that appear to us as virtual moral agents, how relevant is
this discussion for today? First, the artificial agents of the
future are designed now, step-by-step. If we care for a pro-
active ethics that intervenes with its evaluation at the
design stage rather than when the artefact is used, we better
think about the ethical problems now. Second, this dis-
cussion serves to clarify our own self-understanding as
moral beings. In that respect, one of the further lessons to
learn is that if responsibility ascription happens on the basis
of appearance, we should be at least very careful when and
before we morally evaluate humans—inside and outside
the court. Given our reliance of appearance and our lack of
strong arguments for punishment, we should be very cau-
tious and careful in our evaluation of whether or not the
person is responsible, and whether or not punishment is the
best way to respond to what happened.
For thinking about artificial agents such as robots, this
turn towards appearance does not release us from difficult
issues concerning responsibility. For instance, is a military
robot responsible for shooting humans? How is the
responsibility distributed between the robot and certain
humans? My proposal is not to abandon such a reflection,
but rather ask a slightly different question. Instead of
asking whether or not the robot is conscious, rational, free-
willed, etc., let us turn our attention to how the robot
appears: does it ‘exhibit’ such capacities as supposed in
humans? If so, then regardless of whether the robot really
has these capacities and mental states, we should ascribe
moral agency and moral responsibility to the robot. Then
we can ask further questions, such as: does it appear to
share this agency and responsibility with other artificial or
natural agents, how is the precise distribution of these
apparent properties?
Now, let me return to the conditions for moral agency to
further discuss the plausibility and relevance of artificial
moral agency. Let us grant that it is likely that now and in
the near future some robots will have virtual agency; that
is, they will appear to us as acting on the basis of a mental
state. But virtual moral agency, it seems, is a different
matter. One may take the view that if a robot appeared to
have a mental state at all, this state would not seem to be
caused free-willed. By extension, it would not seem that
the robot is applying ‘the moral law’, and/or using its moral
imagination. Indeed, it seems unlikely that such a virtually
free, imaginative robot will ever be built, or will ever be
built in the near future. This implies that, unless and until
anyone builds an entity that appears to have moral agency,
we should blame the users and the designers for morally
bad consequences. If something goes wrong, they must
face the challenge of showing that they (the humans) are
not responsible, since—in contrast to robots—as humans
they will ‘prima facie’, at first sight, appear to us as
morally responsible agents.
In the theatre, a good actor is one who really appears to
have the desires, beliefs, emotions, etc., of his character.
We do not ask about the reality of the desires, beliefs, etc.
But in ‘real’ life we usually do not ask such questions
either. In ‘non-fiction’ life, we interact with humans and
non-humans and ascribe responsibility to them without
investigating the reality of the other’s mental states. If this
is true, we must adapt our moral frameworks in so far as
they are based on an unrealistic epistemological assump-
tion and demand, and at least supplement them with a
moral-aesthetic criterion. If our (inter)actorship has a
virtual side to it, then we must also recognise the virtual
dimension of moral responsibility, blame, and punishment.
The analogy between the theatre and social life has been
employed before, although usually it has not been extended
to the moral life. In As You Like it, Shakespeare wrote his
famous words ‘All the world’s a stage; and all the men and
women merely players’. And in sociology social role is an
important concept, and Latour has introduced the notion of
script in science and technology studies. These concepts
deserve further discussion; however, here I will make some
associations of my own in order to further explore the
analogy in order to support my argument concerning vir-
tual moral agency.
As they enter our world, some artefacts appear as new
players on the scene. The play changes, and this forces us
to review our own role. Perhaps we first have to improvise.
We can also try to give a certain role to them to write their
script. We can try to (re-)direct the play. In any case, what
happens is based on how the human and non-human actors
appear to one another. The masks matter socially and
morally. They blame one another, they praise one another.
Together they write a narrative. They act it out. They are
actors and co-directors, they follow scripts that are written
(be)for(e) them, and they change the script and improvise.
Note that applying the notion of play does not imply that
the moral or social life is not serious. There are winners
and losers. Consider how we treat non-human animals
today: some we treat like princes, others like raw materials.
How we treat them, which role we assign to them, depends
on their masks and appearance. Towards already existing
artificial actors and indeed humans, many of us act in the
same way: cute robots are loved, service robots are used
and ignored. My point is not that we should (not) act in that
way, but that we must recognise how important the virtual
dimension is in social life. If we do so, then we can take
that into account when we re-write the play, look critical at
traditional scripts, and introduce acts and scenes that are
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morally superior to the current ones. We can try to see the
same actors in a new light. We can try to empathise,
imagine how it is to wear the mask of the human or non-
human other. And we can change stage and settings—
institutional and others—in order to promote some actions
rather than others.
Importantly, new artificial actors do not enter the stage
from nowhere. We design them. We can give them the
mask, the appearance we want. Since we love ourselves as
humans, it is very likely that we will give them our own
mask. Or the mask of the animals that remind us of our
own, human infants.
Note that an additional advantage of my approach is that
it can not only account for virtual agency in the so-called
‘real’ world, but also in the virtual worlds created by ICT.
In this context, the standard theory is entirely helpless,
since no-one would seriously contend that a robot avatar
(an avatar that is not connected to a real human being but
run by software) has a ‘mind’ of its own, has ‘mental
states’, etc. Still, we are happy to ascribe virtual respon-
sibility in some instances when immersed in a computer-
generated virtual world, without that this experience
depends on mental states on the part of the robot avatar. AI
adepts may think it will be possible to create mental states
in the future, but in any case the theory of virtual moral
agency and virtual moral responsibility can cope with both
situations. What counts in practice is that the designers of
such robot avatars try to create the illusion that we interact
with a real human agent. This suffices for generating and
sustaining the experience of virtual moral agency and the
corresponding practice of virtual responsibility ascription.
Again, we can apply the normative criterion: if they
manage to create the illusion of virtual moral agency, then
we are justified to hold these ‘entities’—which are virtual
by design—also virtually responsible for what they do to
us.
4 Mind-less morality versus virtual mind morality
(an ethics of appearance)
Let me now further distinguish my approach from other
responses to the limits of the standard theory of moral
agency and moral responsibility. I already discussed two
alternatives that focus on the ‘morality’ of artefacts. But
what about artificial agents? One could object to my
approach: Why not ascribe real responsibility to some of
these agents in some cases? Are there reasons to do so?
Verbeek and Magnani do not really account for the intui-
tion that the moral status of such agents is not exhausted by
a description of what they do (Verbeek) or by the value we
give to them (Magnani). They appear to us as more than a
thing, an object. Can we give a ‘higher’ moral status and
perhaps moral responsibility to such non-humans? Why
should we take humans as the standard, the model for
moral agency anyway? A response that still needs further
discussion, then, is what I called in my introduction
‘lowering the threshold of moral agency’. This I take
Floridi and Sanders to do. I will use this section to dis-
tinguish my own approach from their view in order to
further clarify my own account.
In their influential paper ‘On the Morality of Artificial
Agents’, Floridi and Sanders (2004) share my view that we
should move away from the ‘traditional approach’ which
requires us to find out whether or not agents have mental
states, feelings, emotions, etc. For them, however, the
major problem lies in the traditional anthropocentric con-
ception of agency. Instead of focussing on the human mind,
therefore, they propose a ‘mind-less morality’ (Floridi and
Sanders 2004) which allows us to analyse whether or not a
system is an agent in terms of its interactivity (response to a
stimulus by change of the state of the system), autonomy
(the ability to change without such a stimulus), and
adaptability (the ability to change the transition rules by
which the state is changed). On this basis, they argue that
artificial agents can be accountable sources of moral action,
without being responsible or exhibiting free will (Floridi
and Sanders 2004, p. 351). In other words, they separate
moral agency and moral responsibility, and conceive of the
former in (what they see as) non-anthropocentric terms. In
their view, dogs and artificial systems can be moral agents,
without being morally responsible for their actions (Floridi
and Sanders 2004, p. 368). They claim that artificial agents
can be ‘morally accountable as sources of good and evil—
at the ‘cost’ of expanding the definition of morally charged
agent’ (Floridi and Sanders 2004, p. 372). They conclude
that their account, by analysing entities in non-anthropo-
centric terms, manages to ‘progress past the immediate and
dogmatic answer’ to the problem (Floridi and Sanders
2004, p. 375).
Let me clarify my own approach by objecting to their
assumptions that anthropocentrism is necessarily dogmatic
and something that must be overcome, and that their
approach succeeds in doing that.3
First, it is not clear to me why their systemic approach to
agency is supposed to be entirely non-anthropocentric. As
far as I know, the systems metaphor is a human-made term
for (doing something to) human-made things. We design
systems and apply the label ‘systems’ to artefacts and
combinations of artefacts. We decide that it is a combi-
nation, or we make the combination. In order for there to be
3 A comprehensive discussion of Floridi and Sanders would include
scrutinising their distinction between moral accountability and moral
responsibility and other elements of their view. I limit my discussion
to those aspects of their view and their approach that help me to
clarify my own view and approach.
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a ‘system’, there has to be a (human) subject that orders,
assembles, applies a method to, and makes distinctions and
relations between objects. Technology itself is deeply
‘anthropocentric’ and intrinsically bound up with human
culture. There is no artificial or cultural system separate
from the practices that construct, imagine, and live it.
Second, I believe there is a deeper disagreement between
us about the relation between philosophical understanding
and common sense understanding, and about the method of
philosophy. Their approach is part of philosophy as (meta-)
science, which is a philosophy of suspicion: you ‘ordinary’
people live in the illusion that humans, dogs, and (future)
artificial agents have a moral status, whereas we scientists–
philosophers show and know that these are all systems
which should be analysed in terms of levels of abstraction
(LoA) and other technical terms that really show us the
moral similarities and differences between these entities. In
taking (or at least suggesting) this approach, they are in
agreement with the mind-morality philosophers they criti-
cise. The approach I suggest in my work on robotics and
artificial agents (AA), by contrast, starts from observed or
imagined human-AA interaction, aiming at taking seriously
how humans experience and co-shape such an interaction,
including their potential ascription of human-like agency
and human-like responsibility. Starting from this platform, I
ask the normative question if, how, and when this interac-
tion and ascription could be justified. The dogmatism I want
to progress beyond, then, lies in the assumption—made by
both ‘mindful’ and mindless morality philosophers—that
we can have full access to reality, regardless of whether this
reality is described in terms of mental states or system
states. My suggestion is that we can permit ourselves to
remain agnostic about what really goes on ‘in’ there, and
focus on the ‘outer’, the interaction, and in particular on
how this interaction is co-shaped and co-constituted by how
AAs appear to us, humans.
Part of the ‘folk’ way (to use a term of the science-
oriented philosophers) to think about morality is that if we
perceive moral agency in the other, we also hold that other
responsible. It is also part of our ‘folk’ moral psychology
that if we one day are ‘deceived’ into believing that the
artificial ‘system’ we meet is human, we will treat and
interact with that entity as if it was human. We will con-
sider ‘it’ to be a moral agent and hold ‘it’ responsible. The
famous Turing-test (Turing 1950) and the Chinese Room
thought-experiment (Searl 1980) are used in discussions
about what really is the case about artificial intelligence
and mind (can AI be conscious? Can it have morality? As if
morality is something that can be built-in). But such
thought-experiments depend on appearance: what counts is
how the entity appears to us in our interaction with that
entity, not on what is ‘really’ in the room (which stands for
the mind or the system).
Thus, the imaginative projection of anthropomorphic
features onto beings of which we know that they are not
human, such as pets and pet robots is not necessarily
problematic, as long as we ascribe moral status and moral
responsibility in proportion to the apparent features. Fol-
lowing such an ‘ethics of appearance’ is what we do in
practice: we use moral-aesthetic measures in our interac-
tion with human and non-human others, not moral-episte-
mic measures. Not (only) the ‘content’ but the form,
performance of the other matters to us in concrete (quasi-)
social interaction. Let us turn our attention from episte-
mology and philosophy of mind, directed to objects and
minds (trying to find out the truth about artificial agents), to
the moral-social question, directed to relations between
social others (trying to find out how we can live with
them). My approach is also expansive, but in contrast to
Floridi and Sanders (and perhaps in contrast to Verbeek),
it does not expand the definitions of moral agency we
employ. Instead, I propose to stretch the conceptual
boundaries of the social sphere: let us expand the definition
of ‘others’ from humans to (humans and) non-humans.
When we interact with others, we have only appearance to
go by. Using our senses and our imaginative projection and
empathy, we may well live in ‘illusion’ as far as agency
and responsibility is concerned. But it is not so much the
‘truth’ about which entities ‘really have’ agency and
responsibility that matters in the moral life understood as
the social life. Rather, it is the appearance of the other that
matters with regard to our experience and understanding
of the other’s moral status and responsibility, and with
regard to the practices based on that experience and
understanding.
Perhaps we should be content that such a ‘shortcut’ via
appearance is available to us from an evolutionary point of
view: if we first had to ‘get the concepts right’ and ‘get the
facts right’, our moral, interactive and (quasi)social life
would freeze to death. This would mean that human life
would come to and end. And to many of us, pathetic an-
thropocentrics as we are, leaving the world to our artificial
offspring is an unthinkable and bleak prospect—whether or
not these orphaned entities would count as moral and
responsible agents.
5 Conclusion: the perception and design of virtual
agency and virtual responsibility as artificial
performance
My discussion about the limitations of the standard account
of moral agency and moral responsibility resulted in a
sketch of an alternative approach that shifts the emphasis
from (‘inner’) reality and truth towards (‘outer’) appear-
ance and performance. Now if in (quasi)social interaction
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with humans and non-humans appearance indeed plays
such an important moral role, then the model of agency and
responsibility ascription must be changed from the model
of science to the model of art, in particular what can be
called an art of perception, imagination, and design of
performance. Instead of trying to find out the truth about
the ‘content’ of the other’s mind, it suffices for our moral
practices of moral agency and moral responsibility
ascription that we develop our capability to perceive,
experience, and imagine the form and performance of the
other. In concrete practice and experience, we must try to
find out if this form and performance of the other (and
ourselves) is congruent with the model of human moral
agency we aspire to, a moral-aesthetical ideal that contin-
ues to haunt much of the moral philosophy and philosophy
of action literature: the ideal of a free-willed, self-con-
scious, rational agent, which we should supplement with at
least the capacities for moral sensitivity and moral imagi-
nation. Some humans (at times) and all current artificial
agents are likely to fail this test of moral appearance, but if
and when they meet the criterion, now or in the future, we
are justified in holding them virtually morally responsible
for what they do to us in virtue of their appearance (and
therefore for what they seem to intend to do to us).
With regard to the ascription of moral agency and moral
responsibility in interaction with artificial agents (AAs), I
draw the following conclusion. For the ‘spectator’, decid-
ing about ascribing responsibility to such agents is not
about getting the facts about the (content of the quasi-)
other’s mind right; instead, it is about experiencing, sens-
ing and perceiving a form and performance which we so far
only experienced in interaction with humans. For the
designer, the challenge is to create an artificial ‘actor’ that
produces this appearance. What counts with regard to
moral status and moral responsibility, then, is not so much
the AA’s artificial intelligence (AI), but its artificial per-
formance (AP) with regard to the appearance of agency.
This way of putting the problem is closer to what many
designers really aim at in practice. It is also a concept that
does justice to the quasi-social aspect of interaction
between humans and AAs. It invites us to draw AAs into
the sphere of moral consideration by taking them seriously
as quasi-social entities who are already part of our sphere
of social consideration in virtue of their appearance.
Philosophical reflection on AAs and morality, therefore,
should be practiced not only as a philosophy of mind, but,
at least also, as a social philosophy and a moral aesthetics.
To the extent that such entities appear to us as moral agents
(if they ever do at all), we should generously welcome
them in the conceptual dwellings we built for us, humans.
If they (will) have a role in our social plays, and to the
extent that they (will) have that role, we must consider
them as our fellow actors, and assign virtual agency and
virtual responsibility to them without hesitation.
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